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Did Pension Plan Accounting
Contribute to a Stock Market Bubble?
During the 1990s the assets of corporate deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) pension
plans ballooned as a result of the booming stock market. Because of
accounting rules for DB plans put in place in 1986, this robust growth
provided a substantial, although stealthy, boost to the proﬁts reported by
sponsoring corporations. In particular, the extraordinary returns earned on
pension assets ﬂowed to the bottom line on corporate income statements
through lower net pension cost accruals included in general corporate
expenses. 
These developments may have misled many investors about the value
of corporate equities, because pension cost accruals provide a fairly con-
voluted signal of the underlying value of net pension assets, in two ways.
First, the accounting rules allow firms to smooth the effect of volatility
in asset returns in calculating net pension expense; this smoothing both
hides the variation inherent in the realizations of risky returns and tends
to make current accruals of pension cost a stale measure of a pension
plan’s net asset value. Second, the net costs of financing outstanding
pension liabilities are effectively understated when pension sponsors
assume a future rate of return on plan assets that far exceeds the discount
rate they use to calculate the present value of plan obligations. In effect,
the costs associated with providing a pension plan to employees are offset
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stream of income ﬂowing from the pension portfolio.
In this paper we assess the degree to which investors may have been
fooled by current pension accounting rules and practices. We do so using
two alternative models of pension valuation. The ﬁrst, known as the stan-
dard transparent model, holds that investors gauge the contribution of a
pension plan to the sponsoring ﬁrm’s value by looking at the plan’s
marked-to-market net asset value, which is reported in footnotes to the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements. The second, the “opaque” model proposed by
Jeremy Gold, presumes that the market’s assessment of net pension value
is driven instead by the pension cost accruals reported in the body of the
ﬁrm’s income statement.1
Our analysis applies a standard framework for equity valuation based
on abnormal earnings and shows that, under the current accounting
regime, the market appears to pay more attention to the ﬂow of pension-
induced accruals reported in the body of the income statement than to the
marked-to-market value of pension assets and liabilities reported in the
footnotes. These ﬁndings strongly support the predictions of the opaque
model of pension valuation. We then perform a second battery of tests to
determine whether the market prices a ﬁrm’s pension accruals any differ-
ently than it prices the ﬁrm’s core business earnings. The results suggest
that investors do not distinguish between these two sources of earnings, at
least not in the way that one would expect in an efﬁcient market. If any-
thing, the earnings associated with pension accruals appear to receive a
higher valuation multiple than do core earnings.
Finally, we bring this evidence to bear on the question of whether there
was a substantial pension-induced bubble in equity prices by simulating
ﬁrm-level valuation errors using one of the empirical models employed in
our hypothesis tests. The simulations suggest that, for the average ﬁrm in
the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 with a DB plan, pension-induced valu-
ation errors added 2 to 3 percent to the stock price during the late 1990s.
Although signiﬁcant in terms of absolute dollars of wealth, this source of
error thus explains little of the runup in stock prices over this period.
However, the estimated pension-induced distortions rise considerably in
2001, when the plunge in pension net asset values had not yet shown
through to pension cost accruals. In particular, we estimate that, as of
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pension plan were at least 20 percent overvalued, relative to otherwise
similar firms, and that the unweighted average level of overvaluation of
the stocks of pension-sponsoring firms was 10 percent. When gauged on
a market capitalization–weighted basis, the simulated valuation distor-
tions of firms in the S&P 500 that sponsor pension plans are about half
that size.
Background and Previous Research
Employer-provided pensions were ﬁrst introduced as a form of
deferred compensation in the late nineteenth century. Deﬁned-beneﬁt
pensions became more popular as the work force industrialized and life
expectancies extended beyond the maximum age at which workers could
be productive in an industrial setting. (A deﬁned-beneﬁt pension is one in
which beneﬁts are known in advance and based on the retiring worker’s
past salary and years of service, rather than on the amount of past contri-
butions on the worker’s behalf plus returns.) Pensions seemed an effec-
tive way for employers to reduce employee turnover and regulate
retirement patterns, as well as to encourage productivity, thereby con-
tributing to ﬁrm value.2 These plans became increasingly widespread after
Congress, beginning in the early 1940s, made employer contributions tax-
exempt and allowed deferral of taxation on investment earnings accrued
within the plan.
Although the last twenty years have seen a trend away from DB plans
toward deﬁned-contribution plans, more than two-thirds of ﬁrms in the
S&P 500 currently sponsor a DB pension plan, and the assets these plans
manage have averaged around 15 percent of the market value of the spon-
soring ﬁrm. Indeed, as ﬁgure 1 shows, the fair market value of assets held
by the DB plans of S&P 500 ﬁrms nearly doubled during the second half
of the 1990s, to a peak of just under $1.2 trillion in 1999.
Private, employer-sponsored DB plans are currently regulated under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which
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2. For a more complete discussion of the evolution of private pension funds and their
role in the labor market, see Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994) and McGill and oth-
ers (1996).
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on paying them out of future operating proﬁts) and invest plan assets pru-
dently. Under ERISA rules, if the ratio of the current market value of a
plan’s assets to the current value of its liabilities—the funding ratio—falls
to between 80 and 90 percent, the ﬁrm must under some circumstances
accelerate its cash contributions to the plan. If the funding ratio falls
below 80 percent, accelerated cash contributions are unconditionally
required. In calculating the present value of liabilities so as to determine
the funding ratio, ﬁrms must use a discount rate linked to the thirty-year
U.S. Treasury bond.3 Because plan participants have a legal claim under
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3. More recently, yields on the thirty-year Treasury bond have been driven down by
more than the general decline in long-term rates would dictate, because of the shrinking
supply of this instrument. The consequent decline in discount rates has exacerbated funding
problems for plans whose asset values had already plunged. Pension funds were granted a
temporary reprieve in the form of a two-year period during which they are allowed a
greater deviation from the average thirty-year Treasury bond yield in determining the
Figure 1. Pension Assets and Obligations of S&P 500 Firms, 1993–2001a
Source: Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. Firms with deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) pension plans only (on average 375 ﬁrms each year). Includes back data on ﬁrms added to
composite from 1997 to 1999.
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effectively the residual claimants on any excess or shortfall of funds rela-
tive to that claim. 
Implications for Sponsoring-Firm Value
How assets in a DB pension plan should affect the value shareholders
place on the sponsoring ﬁrm’s equity is most easily understood in a sim-
ple benchmark model with no taxes and no government regulation of pen-
sions. In this model the marked-to-market values of pension assets and
liabilities are transparent to investors and contribute to ﬁrm value dollar
for dollar. This model is often referred to as the consolidated balance
sheet approach, because the assets and liabilities of the pension plan are
viewed no differently from other ﬁnancial assets and liabilities of the
ﬁrm. Here we refer to it as the transparent model, to contrast this view of
pension valuation with the alternative, opaque model, in which the value
of the pension plan is not well understood by investors.
Two modiﬁcations are typically made to the benchmark transparent
model. The ﬁrst arises from the tax preferences afforded to pension plans.
Because plan contributions are tax deductible, each dollar of liability
incurred and funded through such contributions reduces the equity value
of the firm by only (1 – T), where T is the combined federal and state
marginal tax rate. Likewise each dollar of assets in the pension fund
should be valued at its replacement cost, again (1 – T). Several authors
have shown that, beyond the deductibility of contributions, the nontaxa-
bility of returns on pension fund assets has further implications for opti-
mal funding strategies and net pension valuation.4 Firms can minimize
the present-value cost of future pension liabilities by maximizing current
tax-deductible contributions. In addition, Martin Feldstein and Stephanie
Seligman showed that the tax deductibility of contributions and the tax
exemption of returns on pension assets interact with the term structure of
liabilities and the funding schedule of the sponsoring firm in determining
the marginal contribution of net pension liabilities to firm value. Given
these considerations, the marginal effect of a dollar of net pension assets
is nonetheless bracketed by (1 – T) and 1.
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discount rate they use for funding calculations, while Congress reviews the issue of dis-
count rates.
4. Black (1980); Feldstein and Seligman (1981); Tepper (1981).
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insurance that pension funds purchase from the government-run Pension
Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).5 The PBGC covers any shortfall
in funding for pension plans of bankrupt ﬁrms, in effect providing a put
option that trims some of the negative impact of pension liabilities on ﬁrm
value. This insurance has the effect of reducing the cost to shareholders of
the marginal dollar of pension liabilities, although this caveat is more
important for unproﬁtable ﬁrms facing a substantial risk of failure. 
The transparent model, modiﬁed by the tax and insurance considera-
tions just discussed, has been the dominant valuation model for ﬁrms with
DB pension plans in empirical research to date. In the late 1970s the
increased prevalence of underfunded pension plans spurred a group of
empirical studies aimed at estimating the impact of DB pension plans on
ﬁrm valuation.6 A chief concern was that DB pension plans would justiﬁ-
ably reduce saving by plan participants; if, however, share prices then did
not properly reﬂect the extent of underfunding, stockholders would fail to
increase their saving accordingly, producing a net reduction in national
saving. These studies modeled the total market value of the ﬁrm as pro-
portional to the replacement value of its underlying assets and included
unfunded pension liabilities as an explanatory variable. These studies
generally concluded that the market valued net pension liabilities in a
manner consistent with the transparent model.
Despite these ﬁndings, many market participants at the time suspected
that share prices did not adequately reﬂect the mostly unfavorable ﬁnan-
cial position of DB pension plans. In particular, the ﬁnancial community
worried that plan assets and liabilities were measured inconsistently
across ﬁrms and were not adequately disclosed, making it difﬁcult for
investors to accurately determine the impact of DB pensions on ﬁrm
value. Although ﬁrms were required to disclose their net pension assets,
they were not required to do so within their ﬁnancial statements.7 Indeed,
the only manifestation of DB plans in these statements was the cash con-
328 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
5. This result was ﬁrst established by Sharpe (1976). 
6. These papers include Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Mørck (1983),
and Bulow, Mørck, and Summers (1987). Munnell and Ernsberger (1987) also explored the
relationship among the stock market, pension funding, and saving. Mittelstaedt and War-
shawsky (1993), among others, employed a similar framework to examine the impact on
ﬁrm value of liabilities associated with retiree health beneﬁts.
7. See McGill and others (1996) for a more complete description of the evolution of
pension accounting.
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statement. Furthermore, companies used a variety of actuarial methods
and assumptions to determine the market value of plan liabilities.
To address these concerns, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) issued Statement No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions,
which stipulated a new accounting approach to be employed in ﬁscal
years beginning after December 15, 1986.8 Broadly speaking, FAS 87
standardized the actuarial assumptions to be used in valuing pension lia-
bilities and set forth a new method of accounting for pension expense on
the income statement. Rather than book actual cash contributions, compa-
nies would calculate pension expense using a complicated accrual
methodology. The guidelines also required disclosure of the fair market
value of pension assets and liabilities within the footnotes to the annual
ﬁnancial statements.9
Pension Accounting after FAS 87
Under the guidelines established by FAS 87, the measure of pension
expense reﬂected in the income statement, called the net periodic pension
cost (NPPC), is calculated as the annual accrued costs of the pension plan
minus the expected return on plan assets. As shown in table 1, the primary
cost components of the NPPC are service cost and interest cost. “Other
costs” includes amortization of previous gains and losses as well as ad
hoc items such as one-time charges for plan amendments or changes in
actuarial assumptions.
Service cost is equal to the present value of the pension beneﬁts earned
by employees during the year; in essence, it is the cost of deferred com-
pensation. Interest cost is calculated as the beginning-of-year value of
pension obligations multiplied by the plan’s assumed discount rate; this
represents the cost of ﬁnancing the outstanding pension obligation, that is,
the increase in the beneﬁt obligation resulting from the passage of time.
Under FAS 87 guidelines, the assumed discount rate must reﬂect the rate
at which current liabilities could be settled. As a matter of practice, ﬁrms
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8. Financial Accounting Standards Board (1985).
9. Although many of the general principles for setting the actuarial assumptions used in
the accounting calculations are similar in spirit to those used in the funding calculations
required under ERISA, they are not explicitly linked. 
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credit rating.10 The offset to plan costs in the NPPC is the expected return
on plan assets, which is calculated as the product of two items: the
assumed long-run rate of return on plan assets, and the accounting value,
or “market-related value,” of those assets. The market-related value can
be either the current fair market value of assets or a systematically
smoothed accounting value, whereby unexpected returns are amortized
over a period not exceeding ﬁve years. Thus, for ﬁrms that choose the
maximum amortization period,11 the market-related value would be simi-
lar to a ﬁve-year moving average of the true market value. Consequently,
the expected-return component of the NPPC will in many cases reﬂect the
actual market value of pension assets only with a substantial lag.
The key assumption used in calculating the expected-return component
is the long-run rate of return on plan assets, which is generally different
from the discount rate used to calculate the present value of liabilities and
the current year’s interest cost. Under the FAS 87 guidelines, in choosing
this assumption the ﬁrm must consider the return currently being earned
on plan assets and rates of return expected in the future, but it need not
consider the variance in that expected return. Thus, for accounting pur-
330 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
10. Historically, the discount rate used for calculations in the ﬁnancial statements has
been reasonably close to that used for funding calculations.
11. This is the majority of ﬁrms according to Zion and Carcache (2002).
Table 1. Accounting Concepts for Deﬁned-Beneﬁt Pension Plans
Accounting concept Deﬁnition
Service cost Present value of beneﬁts earned in the current year
+ Interest cost Cost of ﬁnancing the outstanding beneﬁt obligation
+ Other costs Includes costs of plan amendments and changes in 
actuarial assumptions
– Expected return on plan assets Assumed return on market-related value
= Net periodic pension cost 
(NPPC)a
– Service cost As deﬁned above
= Pension earnings
Source: Financial Accounting Standards Board (1985).
a. This item is included as a cost on the ﬁrm’s income statement.
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out regard to the riskiness of the underlying portfolio.12
Given that the volatility of actual returns on pension plan assets is not
disclosed to investors, and that the assumption for the expected return on
the plan’s portfolio is not adjusted for risk, Gold argues that FAS 87 for-
malizes a systemic ﬁnancial bias in pension accounting that favors equity
investments.13 In choosing the plan’s expected long-run rate of return on
pension assets, ﬁrms anticipate, or assume, an equity premium. At the
same time, because of the smoothing built into the NPPC from using
expected returns with amortization, little of the volatility that gives rise to
the equity premium shows up on the sponsoring ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial state-
ments. Rather, the underlying income volatility (as well as the effective
boost to leverage) is revealed only through the disclosure of marked-to-
market values for pension assets and obligations in the footnotes to the
ﬁnancial statements.
Gold thus suggests that the standard transparent model of pension val-
uation used in earlier academic analyses likely does not hold. He hypoth-
esizes instead an opaque model of pension valuation, whereby investors
value the stream of pension expense reported on the income statement,
rather than the marked-to-market value of net pension assets as implied
by the transparent model. Because the information presented on the
income statement understates the true risk-adjusted pension expense, the
opaque model implies that the market is prone to overprice ﬁrms that
sponsor DB pension plans.14
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12. Most of our sample period is characterized by long-term interest rates that were low
relative to ﬁrms’ assumed long-run equity returns. Indeed, the average assumed long-run
rate of return in our sample was around 9 percent, whereas the average discount rate was
closer to 7 percent. 
13. Gold (2000).
14. The discrepancy between the assumed rate of return and the discount rate generates
a ﬂow of income from pension plan operations on the income statement of the sponsoring
ﬁrm. To see this, consider a plan that starts the period fully funded, that is, where the value
of assets exactly equals the value of liabilities. The expected return on plan assets, calcu-
lated by multiplying the value of plan assets by the assumed rate of return, will more than
offset the interest cost, calculated as the product of the discount rate and the plan’s liabili-
ties. This excess of expected asset growth over liability growth will partly cover the cost of
beneﬁts earned by employees in the current period (the service cost), and will do so in per-
petuity. Thus it would appear that the labor costs include a beneﬁt that the ﬁrm does not
have to fund completely. 
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managers is clearly at odds with the model of the pension plan as a trans-
parent ﬁnancial subsidiary. First, corporate managers show a strong prefer-
ence for smoothing at the expense of transparency, a preference evidenced
by the heavy lobbying that produced the compromises in the FAS 87
guidelines. Second, the high proportion of equity investments in pension
plans has persisted for decades, despite tax and other considerations that
arguably favor debt.15
The opaque model of pension valuation as laid out by Gold is theoreti-
cal, with little previous empirical evidence to support or refute it. One
exception is an analysis by Mary Barth, William Beaver, and Wayne
Landsman, who tested whether the market values the various components
of net pension expense differently from each other and from other compo-
nents of earnings. In ancillary regressions they also examined the relative
importance of pension balance sheet information and found that, when
pension assets and liabilities are included, the various individual compo-
nents of NPPC are mostly insigniﬁcant.16 Although their results provide
some support for the transparent view of pension valuation, they are
based on data from 1987–90, the initial years under the new accounting
regime, perhaps before valuations fully reﬂected the new information.
More recently, Stephen Brown examined whether investors “discount”
any of the assumptions underlying the calculations of pension liabilities
and concluded that the market penalizes ﬁrms whose assumptions lie out-
side an economically justiﬁable range.17 This result suggests a high
degree of efﬁciency in market pricing; however, we will argue that,
because information on pension cost accruals is omitted, such results
could be spurious.
In recent years the potential for conﬂicting signals from the accruals on
the income statement and the marked-to-market pension balance sheet has
332 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
15. The transparent model with taxes also implies predictions for asset allocation
within the pension plan. Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) assert that the tax-free accrual of
pension investment returns gives ﬁrms the incentive to hold the most highly taxed instru-
ments inside the pension fund, which would imply that pension funds should be invested
100 percent in taxable ﬁxed-income securities. Weighing against this incentive, the tax
deductibility of contributions also provides insurance against investment losses, resulting
in an incentive for taking risks with pension fund assets that potentially explains the high
degree of equity holding by DB pension funds (Bulow, Mørck, and Summers, 1987).
16. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1992, 1993).
17. Brown (2002).
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titioners in the ﬁnancial accounting community have voiced increasing
dissatisfaction with the accounting framework. One notable recent devel-
opment is S&P’s introduction of “core earnings,” in an attempt to create a
standard non-GAAP alternative for gauging operating earnings. (GAAP
is an acronym for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.) One key
departure from standard practice is S&P’s treatment of pension expense
in core earnings, which excludes the expected-return component.
Several major Wall Street ﬁrms and prominent investment gurus such
as Warren Buffett have called for a more fundamental measure of pension
costs. For instance, Jack Ciesielski, and David Zion and Bill Carcache,
argue that service cost—the component of pension cost that represents
accrual of beneﬁts—is the only component that should be included in net
operating income.18 Harris and others suggest that FASB is likely to pro-
pose changes to pension accounting standards similar to recent amend-
ments in U.K. standards, which reduced the smoothing in calculations of
pension costs and separated the compensation and ﬁnancing compo-
nents.19 Indeed, FASB recently announced a project to review standards
for pension accounting, with the goal of issuing a revised standard in
2004. Thus the controversy that has erupted over the last few years indi-
cates that many practitioners believe net pension values are not transpar-
ent to investors. The empirical analysis that follows explicitly tests
whether such concerns are valid.
Empirical Model
To simultaneously gauge the inﬂuence of pension assets and earnings
on equity valuations, we employ the empirical valuation model advanced
by Gerald Feltham and James Ohlson, which is a parsimonious applica-
tion of the residual income model.20 In the residual income model, a
ﬁrm’s market equity value is equal to its book equity value plus the pres-
ent discounted value of its expected abnormal earnings; in per-share
terms, 
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19. Harris and others (2002).
20. Feltham and Ohlson (1995).
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period t + i. In words, abnormal earnings per share is net income (total
earnings per share, or EPS) in excess of the ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital,
where the latter equals the ﬁrm’s required rate of return times its equity
book value per share (BV).
Under simplifying assumptions about the dynamics of abnormal earn-
ings, this model can be reduced to the following equation:
where the multipliers on EPS and BV are a function of the required rate of
return and the dynamics of expected earnings and book value. For
instance, the multiplier on current earnings is larger for ﬁrms with more
highly autocorrelated or faster-growing earnings, holding constant the
path for book value.21 In the simple case where the current level of earn-
ings is expected to be permanent, α2 should equal 1/r, the inverse of the
discount rate.
In implementing this model, we employ analyst forecasts of current-
year earnings rather than lagged actual earnings. We follow this tack
because near-term analyst forecasts generally have much greater explana-
tory power for stock prices than do lagged earnings.22 Presumably the rea-
son is that actual earnings include substantial temporary components that
are idiosyncratic to the period at hand. Forecasts, in contrast, tend to
abstract from idiosyncratic developments and thus should be more closely
correlated with the perceived trend level of earnings.
Our adaptation of the residual value model also includes the twist
introduced by Feltham and Ohlson, where ﬁrm value is expressed as the
value emanating from the ﬁrm’s nonﬁnancial operating activities plus the
value of its ﬁnancial activities. In particular, we divide both the balance
sheet and the income statement of the ﬁrm into two parts: core operations
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21. Under the usual assumed accounting system, for any given path for book value,
together with a given path for earnings, there would be an associated implied path for
dividends.
22. Indeed, in their empirical assessment of the residual income model, Dechow, Hut-
ton, and Sloan (1999, p. 26) show that “analysts’ forecasts of next year’s earnings subsume
value relevant information in [the most recent year’s] earnings.”
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ties. Core book equity value (BVC) is equal to total book equity value
minus the book value of net pension assets (NPA), all per share. Earnings
per share generated by core operations (core EPS) equals total EPS minus
pension earnings per share (pension EPS), the latter being the accruals
associated with the ﬁnancing and management of outstanding pension
obligations and assets. Note that we deﬁne pension EPS as NPPC per
share minus the service cost component; that is, unlike the ﬁnancing of
outstanding pension obligations, the accrual of new pension obligations
from current labor services is treated as a core expense. Thus, in accor-
dance with the transparent view of pension valuation, the ﬁrm’s share
price can be expressed as
where NPA is calculated as the fair market value, per share, of pension
assets less the present value of accrued liabilities, and pension EPS is not
included because it is arguably redundant to the pension balance sheet
measure. 
The ﬁrst hypothesis tested, using equation 3, is whether a ﬁrm’s stock
price reﬂects the fair market value of pension assets and liabilities pub-
lished in its most recent annual 10-K report, in a manner consistent with
the transparent model of pension valuation. Again, theory predicts that the
coefﬁcient on NPA should fall between 1 and (1 – T), where T is the
effective marginal tax rate faced by the ﬁrm, although the coefﬁcient
might also be inﬂuenced by other factors such as the funding status and
the timing of contributions relative to the rate at which liabilities are
accrued.
We then test the transparent model against the opaque model by adding
current-period pension earnings to the regression equation. In theory, this
variable should not contribute to ﬁrm value, since the capitalized value of
current and expected future earnings (or costs) from outstanding net pen-
sion assets (or obligations) should already be reﬂected in the value of net
pension assets. Thus we estimate
In the transparent model, 0.65 < b3 < 1, and b4 = 0. In the opaque view of
pension valuation, b3 = 0 and b4> 0.
() . 4 12 34 0 Pb b b b bu tt tt t =+ ++ + + BVC core EPS NPA pension EPS
() , 3 12 3 Pb b b u tt tt t =+ ++ BVC core EPS NPA
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will provide an indication of the extent to which the stocks of ﬁrms with
DB pension plans are mispriced. Even if investors rely on accounting
earnings to value the pension plan, they might do so in a manner consis-
tent with the transparent model. This would be the case if the magnitude
of b4 were close to the ratio of NPA to pension EPS (or a bit less, assum-
ing a positive effective tax rate on plan assets). Otherwise, investor focus
on pension accruals would result in the ﬁrm’s stock being mispriced. In
the extreme, the market may fail to differentiate between pension earn-
ings and core earnings altogether, a hypothesis examined by testing
whether b4 = b2. If investors do fail to differentiate between these two
components of earnings, the pension earnings of at least some ﬁrms—
particularly those rapidly growing ﬁrms with high core price-earnings
ratios—are probably being overvalued.
Data, Variable Construction, and Sample Statistics
The two principal sources of data for the analysis are Compustat and
I/B/E/S International: the former for historical ﬁnancial data, including
items related to company DB pension plans, and the latter for stock prices
and analyst earnings forecasts. To construct our sample, we begin with all
ﬁrms that were in the S&P 500 anytime from December 1996 through
December 1999. A handful of ﬁrms are excluded because of incomplete
or inscrutable data on their pension plans, but ﬁrms without DB pension
plans are included. For this sample we extract annual ﬁnancial data from
Compustat for the period 1993–2001, including several variables related
to the ﬁnancial position of DB pension plans as well as book equity values
and the number of shares on a fully diluted basis. We begin our analysis in
1993 because many pension variables are unavailable in Compustat
before that year.
Compustat data are merged with data from the I/B/E/S monthly history
ﬁles using ﬁrm CUSIP numbers. Items taken from I/B/E/S include annual
observations on stock price, shares outstanding, actual operating earnings
per share, consensus (mean) forecasts of earnings per share for the current
ﬁscal year and for the following year, and the median analyst long-term
growth forecast. The timing of the data match is chosen so that the com-
pany’s stock price and analyst earnings forecasts are measured subse-
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the ﬁrm’s 10-K report. The annual Compustat data for ﬁrms with ﬁscal
years ending in October through March (mostly December) are matched
with the price and forecast data published by I/B/E/S the subsequent May;
for ﬁrms with ﬁscal years ending April through September, annual ﬁnan-
cial data are matched to November I/B/E/S data. 
After ﬁltering out ﬁrms with incomplete data, we are left with over
4,400 observations, or an average of 490 ﬁrms a year. For most of the
analysis we excluded the relatively few observations for which both cur-
rent-year and subsequent-year earnings per share forecasts are negative,
since the parsimonious dynamics presumed in our valuation model are
poorly suited for ﬁrms for which trend earnings are negative. The ﬁnal
dataset thus contains 4,359 ﬁrm-year observations, 3,335 of them from
ﬁrms with an active DB pension plan.
The key pension variables drawn from Compustat are deﬁned as
follows: 
—Pension plan assets: the fair market value of plan assets
—Projected beneﬁt obligation: the actuarial present value of beneﬁts
earned by employees to date, taking into account expected future salary
increases23
—Prepaid or accrued pension cost: the measure of net pension obliga-
tions recognized in ﬁrm book value 
—Net periodic pension cost (NPPC): the annual expense booked for
DB plans
—Service cost: the cost of beneﬁts accrued during the year (a compo-
nent of NPPC).
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23. If employees leave the ﬁrm or the ﬁrm goes bankrupt, the more appropriate mea-
sure of liability is the accumulated beneﬁt obligation (ABO), often referred to as the termi-
nation beneﬁt. The projected beneﬁt obligation (PBO) differs from the ABO in that it
builds in an assumption of future salary increases for plan participants; it is therefore called
the continuation liability—that is, the true cost of beneﬁts earned to date that the ﬁrm
expects to face if it remains in business. There is some debate as to whether the termination
liability (the ABO) or the continuation liability (the PBO) is the appropriate measure of a
ﬁrm’s pension liability. For the vast majority of observations in our sample, the prospect of
bankruptcy is remote, and thus the PBO would seem to be the more appropriate measure.
But variations in the ABO and the PBO (over time or across ﬁrms) are likely to be quite
similar, and therefore we do not believe our results would be fundamentally different if the
ABO were used instead. Empirically, the point is moot: the ABO is not available for most
ﬁrms in recent years, because they are no longer required to report it in the footnotes to
their ﬁnancial statements. 
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deﬁned as the difference between plan assets and the projected beneﬁt
obligation, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Our discussion
thus far presumes that the market values of pension assets and liabilities
reported in the notes to the ﬁnancial statements are seen as accurate. Mea-
suring the market value of assets is relatively straightforward, but calcu-
lating the present value of pension liabilities requires some important
assumptions, including an assumed discount rate, as discussed earlier, and
an assumed rate of future salary increases for covered employees.
Although the FASB’s guidance on the discount rate seems economically
sound, ﬁrms retain some leeway in choosing it; thus the present value of
liabilities reported in the ﬁnancial statements could understate (or over-
state) the true value. That said, it appears that most ﬁrms choose a reason-
able discount rate, and we do not observe many ﬁrms changing their
assumed discount rate in ways unrelated to changes in market conditions.
We are therefore comfortable with a maintained assumption that marked-
to-market net pension assets is a good measure of the ﬁrm’s pension
exposure.
As discussed earlier, the component of pension cost related to the net
ﬁnancing of pension beneﬁts is the NPPC excluding the service cost, a net
value that can be positive or negative and is hereafter labeled pension
earnings. To conform to the valuation model, pension earnings is con-
verted to an after-tax per-share basis as follows: 
pension EPS = 0.65 × (NPPC – service cost)/number of shares. 
Because we cannot directly measure expected pension earnings, we use
pension earnings from the year recently ended (two to eight months ear-
lier) as a proxy. We then deﬁne core earnings as expected current-year
earnings (from I/B/E/S) minus actual pension earnings from the previous
year: core EPS = EPS – pension EPS.
Sample Statistics on Pension Exposure
Figure 2 provides a perspective on the sample variation in pension plan
balance sheet exposure for ﬁrms with DB plans. The value of net pension
assets is plotted by year as a percentage of the sponsoring ﬁrm’s market
equity value. Each vertical bar plots the cross-sectional range of pension
338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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cles plot the average exposure, in the indicated year. In 1995 the distribu-
tion of net pension values was centered near zero but ranged from about
–4 percent of ﬁrm market value at the 10th percentile to 5 percent at the
90th percentile. By 1999 the positive end of the distribution had shifted
substantially higher, putting the 90th percentile exposure at nearly 15 per-
cent. However, after two years of declining stock prices and interest rates,
the distribution of pension exposures at the end of 2001 had shifted back
to near its sample-period lows, with the average ﬁrm now experiencing a
drag from its pension plan. 
Figure 3 shows analogous statistics for pension earnings as a percent-
age of expected total earnings. In every year the distribution of pension
earnings is seen to be centered in positive territory; however, as with the
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Figure 2. Value of Net Pension Assets as a Share of Sponsor Equity Market Value,
1993–2001a
Source: Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. Calculated for S&P 500 ﬁrms with DB pension plans that satisfy the data criteria for analysis, on average 379 ﬁrms per year.
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markedly during the late 1990s. By 2000 pension earnings accounted for
about 9 percent of the average ﬁrm’s expected earnings, and roughly
22 percent of those of ﬁrms at the 90th percentile. At the end of 2001, the
average boost from pension earnings remained quite high, as accounting
earnings continued to beneﬁt from the amortization of high returns in pre-
vious years. Indeed, for the 90th-percentile ﬁrm, pension earnings in 2001
accounted for nearly 25 percent of total expected earnings.
These two measures of pension plan value were clearly at odds in 2000
and 2001, and the conﬂict was largely driven by the ﬁve-year amortiza-
tion of gains. Table 2 conveys the subtler and potentially more pervasive
conﬂict between pension earnings and plan fair market value. The table
shows, for each year, the sample aggregate ratio of year-end net pension
value to that year’s pension earnings. If one were to think about valuation
in terms of a price-earnings ratio, this ratio would indicate the appropriate
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Figure 3. Pension Earnings as a Share of Expected Total Earnings, 1993–2001a
Source: Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. Calculated for the same sample as in ﬁgure 2. Pension earnings is deﬁned as (after-tax) net periodic pension cost minus ser-
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any given year. For instance, at the end of 1997, the actual value of net
pension assets totaled $138 billion. That year pension earnings totaled
$8.5 billion, and the ratio of these two ﬁgures is 16.2. Thus, roughly
speaking, if at the end of 1997 investors had valued ﬁrms’ pension earn-
ings at a multiple of 16.2, the effect on market value would have been no
different than if they had instead used the value of net pension asset posi-
tions reported in the footnotes to that year’s ﬁnancial statements.
The last column shows the aggregate annual price-earnings ratio for
those same ﬁrms, that is, the ratio of their year-end equity market value to
that year’s earnings. In 1997, for instance, this ratio is 23.3, well above
the 1997 ratio of pension net asset value to pension earnings. Clearly, if
investors did not distinguish between pension earnings and core earnings,
but instead valued them at the same multiple, then ﬁrms’ pension earnings
are likely to have been overvalued. The most glaring disparity, of course,
is at the end of 2001. By then the aggregate value of net pension positions
had plunged to a negative $2 billion, while pension earnings for these
ﬁrms totaled $20.4 billion. At that point in time, naively valuing pension
earnings, rather than taking account of pension net asset positions, would
almost surely have led to nontrivial valuation errors. 
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Table 2. Aggregate Net Pension Assets, Pension Earnings, and Price-Earnings
Ratios of S&P 500 Firms with Deﬁned-Beneﬁt Pension Plans, 1993–2001a
Net pension Pension  Ratio of net
assets earningsb pension assets Price-
(billions of (billions of  to pension  earnings 
Year dollars) dollars) earnings ratioc
1993 –14 2.7 –5.2 15.9
1994 14 3.8 3.7 15.7
1995 18 3.9 4.6 16.5
1996 74 5.6 13.2 19.2
1997 138 8.5 16.2 23.3
1998 121 11.1 10.9 26.8
1999 251 16.3 15.4 23.1
2000 187 20.6 9.1 21.7
2001 –2 20.4 –0.1 20.7
Source: Compustat and I/B/E/S data.
a. Statistics are calculated for S&P 500 ﬁrms with deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions that satisfy our data criteria for analysis (on aver-
age about 370 ﬁrms a year).
b. Net periodic pension cost minus service cost (as deﬁned in table 1) after tax. 
c. Market value divided by annual net operating earnings in the previous year. Operating earnings are from I/B/E/S and repre-
sent the views of securities analysts; this measure often differs from (is usually higher than) S&P’s “reported earnings.”
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sion earnings is provided in table 3, which focuses on data from 1995,
1999, and 2001. The year-speciﬁc correlation between pension earnings
and net pension value, each normalized by ﬁrm market value to remove
any scale effects, is shown by the numbers along the diagonal. This corre-
lation is highest in 1995, at 0.9, edges lower in 1999, and actually turns
negative in 2001. The mismatch of information in 2001 is also reﬂected
by the strong positive (off-diagonal) correlation between pension earn-
ings in 2001 and net pension value in 1999.
Results of Empirical Tests
Testing the Transparent versus the Opaque 
View of Pension Valuation
As discussed earlier, in the transparent view of pension valuation, the
market incorporates the value of net pension assets directly. In the opaque
view, the market prices net pension assets only indirectly, by valuing the
pension-related accruals booked in accordance with FAS 87. We estimate
equations 3 and 4 in order to test which of these two hypotheses better
explains actual ﬁrm values; table 4 shows the results, with robust standard
errors reported below the coefﬁcient estimates. All regressions include
semiannual time dummies and, except where noted otherwise, use the full
panel of observations.
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Table 3. Correlations between Pension Earnings and Net Pension Assets, 1995, 1999,
and 2001a
Net pension assetsc
Pension EPSb 1995 1999 2001
1995 0.90 0.39 0.15
1999 0.41 0.77 –0.04
2001 0.21 0.63 –0.35
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. Calculated for S&P 500 ﬁrms with deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions that satisfy our data criteria for analysis in the indicated year.
For these calculations only, both net pension assets and pension EPS are normalized by the ﬁrm’s stock price, to remove any spu-
rious correlation induced by cross-sectional differences in scale.
b. After-tax net periodic pension cost minus service cost, per share. 
c. Fair market value of plan assets less the present value of obligations, per share, at the end of the ﬁscal year. 
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the transparent view (modeled by equation 3), which holds that the value
of net pension assets inﬂuences the stock price, whereas that of pension
earnings is superﬂuous and thus excluded from the equation. At ﬁrst blush
the results appear to conﬁrm the predictions of the transparent model: the
coefﬁcient on net pension assets is 0.76, with a standard error of 0.10,
implying that an additional dollar of value in net pension assets per share
raises the ﬁrm’s stock price by 76 cents. This point estimate falls squarely
within the range predicted by the transparent model.
The estimated effects of the other variables on ﬁrm value are quite rea-
sonable. The coefﬁcient on expected core EPS is estimated quite precisely
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Table 4. Stock Price Regressions Testing the Transparent Model 
against the Opaque Modela
Regression speciﬁcation
Independent variable 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6  4-7
Core EPSb 9.22 9.26 8.99 9.26 9.83 8.38 8.57
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.34) (0.39) (0.40)
Pension EPS 11.02 8.62 10.81 8.37
(1.72) (1.83) (1.20) (1.89)
Net pension assetsc 0.76 –0.02 0.14 –0.12 –0.09 –0.44
(0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Pension dummyd 0.83 0.44 1.07 0.45 0.30
(0.50) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.64)
Core book valuee 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.27
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth forecastf 0.94 0.93 1.06 0.93 1.03 0.99 0.97
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Lagged net  0.63
pension assets (0.19)
Twice-lagged net  0.53
pension assets (0.19)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.621 0.628 0.630 0.628 0.578 0.800 0.802
Root mean square  12.44 12.34 11.82 12.33 13.33 9.67 9.63
error
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. The dependent variable is the stock price a few months after the end of the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year. The sample size is 4,359 in all
cases except column 4-3, where it is approximately 3,800. All regressions include semiannual time dummies. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
b. Expected current-year earnings per share (from I/B/E/S) minus pension EPS (deﬁned as in table 3) in the previous year
(except in column 4-3, where pension EPS is that in the current year). 
c. Deﬁned as in table 3.
d. Equals 1 if the ﬁrm has a DB plan, and 0 otherwise. 
e. Equity book value less the book value of net pension assets, per share. 
f. Median analyst forecast of the ﬁrm’s long-term earnings growth rate, in percent (from I/B/E/S). 
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ings raises a ﬁrm’s stock price by $9.22 on average. The coefﬁcient on
core book value, again deﬁned as book value per share excluding the book
value of net pension assets per share, is positive and signiﬁcant as
expected. The median analyst forecast of each ﬁrm’s long-term growth is
included in the regression and has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on
stock price. Because the existence of a pension plan is likely to be corre-
lated with certain omitted ﬁrm characteristics, such as ﬁrm age, that are
potentially correlated with earnings dynamics, we also include a dummy
variable to control for the existence of a DB pension plan; however, the
coefﬁcient on this variable is insigniﬁcant.
Although table 4 does not report the results, we tested a similar speciﬁ-
cation in which pension assets and obligations were entered separately in
the regression, allowing a test of our restriction that net pension assets is a
sufﬁcient statistic for the two sides of the pension balance sheet. In this
regression the coefﬁcient estimates on pension assets and obligations
were 0.78 and –0.80, respectively, and therefore we can easily accept the
restriction imposed in the ﬁrst regression; that is, net pension assets is a
sufﬁcient statistic for characterizing the valuation effect of the pension
plan balance sheet information as reported in the footnotes of company
ﬁnancial statements. 
To test the transparent model against the opaque model, we next esti-
mate equation 4, and column 4-2 of table 4 shows the results. Here we add
pension EPS, deﬁned as pension earnings per share in the year just ended,
our primary proxy for expected pension earnings. The estimated coefﬁ-
cient on pension EPS is 11.02, and it is both statistically signiﬁcant and a
bit larger than the coefﬁcient on core EPS. The coefﬁcient on core EPS is
little changed from its value in column 4-1. Strikingly, the coefﬁcient on
net pension assets falls to zero, which constitutes a rejection of the trans-
parent view of pension valuation. Given this result, a reasonable inter-
pretation of the estimated effect of net pension assets in the initial
speciﬁcation is that it was spurious, a consequence of its correlation with
the omitted variable, namely, pension earnings.
In estimating equation 4 as a test of the two models of pension valua-
tion, we are treating the transparent model as if it were nested within the
opaque model. Alternatively, these two models could be viewed as not
nested. In that case the results presented in column 4-2 would not be the
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and James MacKinnon,25 we perform a joint test of the transparent and
opaque models by taking the ﬁtted values from the estimation of equa-
tion 3 and including them in place of net pension assets in the estimation
of equation 4. Signiﬁcance of the ﬁtted values would constitute evidence
in favor of the transparent model. We perform this test and again reject
the transparent model in favor of the opaque model.
To examine the robustness of our rejection of the transparent model,
we undertook a number of additional experiments. We estimated equa-
tions 3 and 4 on each of nine annual cross sections separately, using
robust regression. As table 5 shows, the transparent model is easily
rejected in eight of the nine annual samples. Only in the 1998 sample does
the transparent model win out, with net pension assets remaining signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level when pension earnings was included. Perhaps
the most convincing evidence is the fact that the opaque model clearly
dominates in the 2000 and 2001 cross sections, when NPA and pension
earnings were diverging.
In another sensitivity test, shown in column 4-3 of table 4, we examine
whether these results are sensitive to our chosen proxy for expected pen-
sion earnings (pension EPS). Here, rather than use actual pension earn-
ings from the year just ended as the proxy for expected current-year
pension earnings, we use the realized value of current-year pension earn-
ings. This amounts to assuming perfect foresight on the part of investors,
which might not be unreasonable given that the value of pension earnings
is to a great extent predetermined as of the beginning of the year. The
downside is that using this proxy reduces the sample size, because we lose
the last observation on each ﬁrm, including the entire 2001 sample.
Nonetheless, the results are little changed: the coefﬁcient on net pension
assets is again very small and statistically insigniﬁcant, whereas the coef-
ﬁcient on pension earnings is a bit smaller than before but, again, close to
the coefﬁcient on core earnings.
Column 4-4 presents the results from estimating the pure opaque model.
Here we return to our baseline proxy for expected pension earnings and
Julia Lynn Coronado and Steven A. Sharpe 345
24. Essentially, if the models are not nested, then the parameters on the independent
variables that the models have in common are not separately identiﬁable in this regression. 
25. Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1440-05 BPEA/Coronado  07/17/03  08:13  Page 346drop net pension assets from the regression, which should raise the preci-
sion of the coefﬁcient estimate on pension earnings and allow for a
cleaner comparison of the coefﬁcients on the two components of earn-
ings. We view this as our benchmark regression for subsequent tests of
the relative valuation effects of core and pension earnings. As expected,
the coefﬁcient on pension earnings, at 10.81, is little changed from col-
umn 4-2, and its standard error drops.
As discussed earlier, past returns are only gradually amortized into the
accounting measure of assets used to calculate expected returns on plan
assets. Consequently, if the market focused only on reported pension
earnings, it presumably would be using stale information. We test this
interpretation in column 4-5, which shows the results of estimating the
transparent model (equation 3) but with the lagged and twice-lagged
value of net pension assets included in the set of regressors. As shown,
both lagged variables have large and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, whereas the
current value of net pension assets is now insigniﬁcant, consistent with
our interpretation that investors are valuing ﬁrms based on the out-of-date
information on net pension plan value reﬂected in pension earnings.
In the last two columns we reestimate equations 3 and 4, but with ﬁrm
ﬁxed effects. Here the regression gauges the effects of within-ﬁrm varia-
tion over time, which makes the estimated effects quite sensitive to tim-
ing. Indeed, in contrast to column 4-1, the coefﬁcient on the net pension
assets in column 4-6 is effectively zero, and, when pension EPS is
included (column 4-7), net pension assets has a negative marginal effect
on stock price. The ﬁxed effects regressions thus provide rather com-
pelling support for the opaque view of DB pension valuation.26
The Market Valuation of Pension Earnings
Because our results support the hypothesis that investors price the con-
tribution of a ﬁrm’s pension plan to ﬁrm value by looking at the associ-
ated stream of accounting earnings, we next consider whether this result
necessarily implies mispricing. Conceivably, investors might be extract-
ing the necessary information from pension accruals and valuing pension
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26. Because of the potential for disproportionate inﬂuences from outliers, the regres-
sions in table 3 were also estimated using robust regression, which iterates after excluding
outliers. The coefﬁcient estimates are quite similar (although standard errors appear much
smaller and are not robust against heteroskedasticity; results not shown), leaving our con-
clusions intact.
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value. One sign of mispricing would be if the market appeared to value
pension earnings at the same multiple as core earnings. This not only
would suggest a failure to differentiate, but would also mean that pension
earnings are overvalued, since, as table 2 showed, the typical ﬁrm’s ratio
of net pension value to pension earnings tends to be about half the ratio of
its market value to its earnings (its price-earnings ratio). In tables 6 and 7
we stress-test our ﬁnding (in column 4-4 of table 4) that a dollar of pen-
sion earnings is valued the same as a dollar of core earnings.
In the ﬁrst test we reestimate the opaque model allowing for year-
speciﬁc coefﬁcients on the two earnings components. Those coefﬁcient
estimates and their standard errors are reported in table 6. As shown, the
coefﬁcient on pension earnings is as large as or larger than the core earn-
ings coefﬁcient in every year except 1998 and 1999. The coefﬁcient on
pension earnings is statistically smaller, however, only in 1999, a year
that also has an unusually low core earnings coefﬁcient. It is perhaps not
surprising that standard valuation models perform relatively poorly at the
end of 1999, given the scant attention that the market seemed to pay to
fundamentals at the time. Perhaps the most interesting result is the 2001
coefﬁcient on pension earnings, which is a relatively high 14.9, despite
the fact that pension earnings were an extremely poor signal of the under-
lying net pension value that year. Thus the conclusion that pension earn-
ings are valued as highly as core earnings holds up when the source of
identiﬁcation is primarily cross-sectional.
Table 7 presents a further set of sensitivity tests. The regression
reported in column 7-1 adds a term that interacts the analyst growth fore-
cast and expected current-year earnings per share (core EPS + pension
EPS) within the benchmark opaque model, to allow for a nonlinear effect
of growth expectations on ﬁrm value. Interacting growth expectations
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Table 6. Stock Price Regressions Interacting Earnings Components with Yearsa
Earnings 
component 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Core EPS 9.0 8.1 9.7 10.4 12.5 9.9 7.1 7.9 10.0
(0.8) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (0.6) (0.6)
Pension EPS 10.4 13.2 14.1 18.4 15.3 8.1 4.0 10.2 14.9
(2.0) (2.5) (1.8) (2.9) (2.3) (2.2) (2.2) (1.7) (3.1)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. Results are for a regression speciﬁcation identical to that in column 4-4 in table 4, except that the two earnings components
are interacted with year dummies. The R
2 of the regression is 0.642.
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forecasts apply to the total current earnings base; thus the effect of pen-
sion earnings is a little more difﬁcult to parse out in this speciﬁcation. In
any case the estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction term is only margin-
ally signiﬁcant, whereas the estimated effects of core EPS and pension
EPS are still statistically equivalent and quite close to the coefﬁcients in
the benchmark opaque model.27
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27. The growth forecast has been mean adjusted, so that adding its interaction with
earnings does not have a level-shifting effect on the two noninteracted earnings variables,
which makes it easier to compare results with speciﬁcations that exclude the interaction
term. Like all the other speciﬁcations, this one was also estimated using robust regression.
In that case the estimated interaction term is larger and highly signiﬁcant; however, the
coefﬁcients on the two earnings components were little changed (results not shown). 
Table 7. Stock Price Regressions Gauging the Relative Valuation 
of Core and Pension EPSa
Regression speciﬁcation
Independent variable 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6  7-7
Core EPS 9.25 9.03 12.12 7.53 9.63
(0.30) (0.31) (0.62) (0.41) (0.90)
Pension EPS 10.72 10.03 9.69 12.85 15.36 7.96 14.04
(1.18) (1.24) (1.16) (1.34) (3.17) (1.65) (4.29)
Pension dummy 0.43 1.10 0.21 2.25 0.68
(0.50) (0.55) (0.48) (0.53) (0.61)
Core book value 0.13 0.23 0.02 0.30 0.21 0.37 0.29
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Growth forecast 0.72 1.11 0.80 1.07 0.88 1.24 0.94
(0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Growth × EPS 0.17
(0.10)
Core EPS (–1)b 8.11
(0.36)
Core EPS (+1)c 9.33
(0.28)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.628 0.559 0.652 0.784 0.667 0.868 0.781
Root mean square   12.33 13.45 11.92 9.32 11.80 7.81 10.25
error
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. The dependent variable is the stock price a few months after the end of the ﬁscal year. Sample size is 4,359 in all speciﬁca-
tions except column 7-2, where it is approximately 4,229. All regressions include semiannual time dummies. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Deﬁnitions are as in table 4 except where noted otherwise.
b. Total EPS in the previous year minus pension EPS.
c. Expected EPS in the next year minus pension EPS.
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implementation of the residual value framework. Here, we replace
expected core earnings with actual lagged core earnings, core EPS(–1),
calculated as total EPS minus pension EPS, both from the year just ended.
Our data requirement that both total and core earnings be positive reduces
the sample by 130 observations in this speciﬁcation, to 4,229 ﬁrm-year
observations. Using actual core earnings reduces the regression’s adjusted
R2 and raises the root mean square error. Moreover, the coefﬁcient on
core EPS(–1), at 8.1, is a bit smaller than that on core EPS in the bench-
mark speciﬁcations. The coefﬁcient on pension EPS is also a bit smaller
here but signiﬁcantly larger than the coefﬁcient on core EPS(–1). This
result is probably due to core earnings having a larger transitory compo-
nent than pension earnings; using expected core earnings presumably
dampens the inﬂuence of such transitory components.
In column 7-3 we present results based on yet another measure of core
earnings. Here, core EPS(+1) is constructed by subtracting pension EPS
(in the year just ended) from the analyst forecast of next year’s earnings.
This more forward-looking measure might be an even better proxy for the
perceived “trend” level of core earnings, since it should be inﬂuenced less
by cyclical factors that could be at play in current-year forecasts. As
shown, the adjusted R2 for this speciﬁcation is indeed somewhat higher,
but the coefﬁcient values and conclusions are essentially unchanged.
The fact that the coefﬁcients on core earnings and pension earnings are
statistically equivalent could indicate that investors do not distinguish
between these two sources of earnings. Alternatively, investors might
recognize the two disparate sources of earnings, but they just happen to
price pension earnings at the same multiple as they price core earnings for
the average ﬁrm. Differentiating between these possibilities might affect
the interpretation of our results, or at least the particulars of any policy
ramiﬁcations. 
To discern whether investors recognize the difference between core
earnings and pension earnings, we divide the sample into ﬁrms with high
and ﬁrms with low price-earnings ratios based on each ﬁrm’s median
price-earnings ratio, measured for our sample as the stock price divided
by expected current-year earnings per share. It is difﬁcult to concoct a
rational justiﬁcation for the pension earnings of these two groups of ﬁrms
to be valued differently. However, if investors are naively valuing pen-
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the pension earnings of ﬁrms with high price-earnings ratios. Columns
7-4 and 7-5 show the benchmark model estimates for the ﬁrms with low
and ﬁrms with high price-earnings ratios, respectively.
As one would expect—almost by deﬁnition—the coefﬁcient estimate
on core EPS for ﬁrms with low price-earnings ratios is smaller than it is
for those with high ratios: roughly 9 versus 12. What is more interesting is
that within each group the coefﬁcient on pension earnings exceeds that on
core earnings. Moreover, it appears that the pension earnings of the aver-
age high-priced ﬁrm are valued more highly than those of the average
low-priced ﬁrm, although this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The ﬁnal two columns in table 7 show the results from estimating a
ﬁxed effects model on the same two groups. The results here are more
clear-cut: the coefﬁcients on both core EPS and pension EPS are larger at
high-priced  ﬁrms than the respective coefﬁcients at low-priced ﬁrms.
Thus it would appear that investors implicitly extrapolate to the pension
earnings of ﬁrms with high price-earnings ratios the more robust growth
prospects these ﬁrms presumably enjoy in their core businesses. Taken
together, these results reinforce our earlier conclusion that investors do
not appropriately discount pension earnings.
Estimating the Value of Pension Earnings 
with a Dividend Discount Model
One potential criticism of the inferences from table 7 is that they are
model-dependent. Here we evaluate the relative contributions of core and
pension earnings to ﬁrm value within a different model: a more traditional
dividend discount-type model. With net pension assets dropped from the
regression, there is less impetus to be bound to the standard Ohlson-style
model and the consequent linear relation between market equity value,
book value, and earnings.28
Instead, we consider a regression equation derived from the standard
Gordon growth valuation model: 
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r is the discount rate, and EPS is current earnings per share. Taking logs
of both sides yields
Equation 6 is an appropriate valuation formula under the hypothesis that
pension earnings are valued no differently from core earnings. However,
to test this hypothesis, we ﬁrst subtract the log of core earnings from both
sides of the equation to obtain
The empirical implementation of this model is as follows:
where z is a vector of time dummy variables that control for time varia-
tion in r, the required return on equity. Testing whether b1 = 1 is equiva-
lent to testing the hypothesis that the two earnings sources are identically
priced. If investors valued only core earnings and ignored pension earn-
ings, we would expect to ﬁnd b1 = 0. A coefﬁcient between 0 and 1 would
imply that, on average, investors place greater value on a dollar of core
earnings than on a dollar of pension earnings. Our earlier tests (based on
equation 4) suggest that b1 might exceed unity, implying that pension
earnings are, in effect, accorded a greater multiple than core earnings. 
Table 8 shows results from estimating equation 8, with robust standard
errors shown in parentheses below the coefﬁcient estimates. In addition to
the variables from the model, each regression includes a control for ﬁrm
size (the logarithm of ﬁrm assets) and a dummy variable indicating
whether the ﬁrm has a DB pension plan. To the extent that the growth
variable is an imperfect indicator of long-term growth expectations, the
price-earnings ratio (the ratio of price to core earnings) could arguably be
negatively related to ﬁrm size and the presence of a DB plan, because
larger, older ﬁrms tend to be slower growing. Finally, all regressions
include semiannual time dummies.
Column 8-1 in table 8 shows the results from the basic speciﬁcation,
where expected core earnings are based on current-year earnings fore-
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1.22. Given its small standard error, we can easily reject the hypothesis
that this coefﬁcient is less than 1.0. Thus we accept the hypothesis that the
ratio of price to core earnings increases by at least 1 percent for a 1 per-
cent increase in the ratio of total earnings to core earnings. This result
reinforces our evidence from table 6 suggesting that investors value pen-
sion earnings at a multiple at least as great as that on core earnings, if not
higher.
Coefﬁcients on the other variables have the expected signs and are of
reasonable magnitudes. The coefﬁcient on the dividend payout rate is
well below unity, which is to be expected if payout rates tend to revert
back to some norm after being buffeted by shocks to earnings.29 The coef-
ﬁcient on the logarithm of the growth forecast is 0.63, which implies that
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29. As shown by Sharpe (2002), in a dynamic version of equation 8 in which the pay-
out rate is assumed to revert toward some target level, the coefﬁcient on the logarithm of
Table 8. Price-Earnings Ratio Regressions Quantifying the Valuation 
of Pension Earnings in a Dividend Discount Modela
Regression speciﬁcation
Independent variable 8-1 8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5
Log [EPS/core EPS] 1.22 1.24 1.10 1.55
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Log [EPS(+1)/core EPS(+1)] 1.08
(0.13)
Log [dividend payout]b 0.21 0.16 0.54 0.17 0.22
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Log [growth forecast] 0.63 0.51 0.39 0.26 0.80
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
Log [total assets]c –0.05 –0.04 0.02 –0.04 –0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Pension dummy –0.10 –0.07 –0.02 –0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 2.47 1.89 3.29 3.03 1.19
(0.13) (0.08) (0.35) (0.18) (0.16)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.339 0.748 0.438 0.399
Root mean square error 0.453 0.389 0.316 0.338 0.456
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of the stock price to core EPS, taken a few months after the end of the
ﬁscal year. Sample size is 4,359 in all speciﬁcations, and all regressions include semiannual time dummies. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Deﬁnitions are as in tables 4 and 7 except where noted otherwise.
b. Logarithm of recent (annualized) dividends per share divided by EPS. 
c. Logarithm of the book value of ﬁrm assets in the previous year. 
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boost the stock price by 6.3 percent. The pension dummy and ﬁrm size
have negative coefﬁcients, consistent with the presumption that larger
ﬁrms and those with DB plans tend to have lower price-earnings ratios.
Finally, the adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.41, indicating that the inde-
pendent variables explain a good deal of the variation in the price-to-core
earnings ratio.
Column 8-2 shows the results from estimating the same model, but
using analyst forecasts of the subsequent year’s earnings to gauge the
expected level of core earnings. Here the coefﬁcient estimate on the ratio
of total to core earnings is 1.08, which is not signiﬁcantly different from
1, suggesting that there is no difference in the multiple that investors
place on core earnings versus pension earnings. The other coefﬁcient esti-
mates are similar to those in the ﬁrst regression. 
Column 8-3 shows the results of estimating a ﬁxed effects version of
the initial speciﬁcation. Here the coefﬁcient estimate on the earnings ratio
is 1.24, which is very close to the ﬁrst result and conﬁrms that the infer-
ence applies not only cross-sectionally but also to movements in a given
ﬁrm’s valuation over time. Coefﬁcients on the other variables differ
somewhat, but they again have the predicted sign and are of plausible
magnitude. The addition of ﬁxed effects yields a substantially tighter ﬁt.
Columns 8-4 and 8-5 show results from estimating the model for the
subsamples with low and high price-earnings ratios, respectively, with
ﬁrms grouped according to their median ratio of price to total expected
EPS. Paralleling the argument made earlier, if investors were valuing pen-
sion earnings appropriately, we would expect pension earnings to have a
less than proportionate impact on the stock prices of high-priced ﬁrms,
even if this were not the case for low-priced ﬁrms. On the contrary, the
estimated coefﬁcient of 1.55 on the ratio of total to core EPS for the high-
priced group suggests that pension earnings have a greater effect than core
earnings on the stock price of high-priced ﬁrms. We thus conclude that our
earlier  ﬁnding, that investors are valuing pension earnings at least as
highly as core earnings and that they are possibly not even distinguishing
between these sources of earnings, is robust across models of ﬁrm value.
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the payout ought to be between 0 and 1; moreover, for plausible speeds of reversion, that
coefﬁcient is likely to fall in the lower end of this range.
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In light of our main ﬁndings—that the market seems to ignore the pen-
sion balance sheet while placing at least as much value on pension earn-
ings as on core earnings—we apply a fairly straightforward approach to
estimate the consequent mispricing of sponsoring ﬁrms. To construct
ﬁrm-level equity valuation errors, we ﬁrst estimate our log price-earnings
ratio model (equation 7) with the addition of time dummy variables and
other controls used in the table 8 regressions. From the resultant coefﬁ-
cient estimates, we construct predicted price-earnings ratios for each ﬁrm
in each year. Under the now-plausible assumption that investors do not
differentiate between core and pension earnings, the increment to the
stock price attributable to pension earnings is estimated by multiplying,
for each ﬁrm in each year, the simulated price-earnings ratio by the corre-
sponding value of pension earnings per share. Finally, the implied valua-
tion error is calculated as the difference between this inferred actual
increment to the stock price and the increment predicted by the transpar-
ent model of pension valuation, that is, the tax-adjusted value of net pen-
sion assets, (1 – T) × NPA.
Figure 4 shows the results from two sets of such calculations that use
alternative assumptions about the effective tax rate T. In each case we
plot the annual range of pricing errors, from the 10th to the 90th per-
centile. The ranges plotted by the left-hand line in each pair are calcu-
lated under the assumption that T = 0, whereas the right-hand lines show
the results assuming T = 0.35. For each simulation we also show the
annual aggregate weighted-average pricing error for our pension sample,
denoted by the solid circle, and the annual unweighted average pricing
error, denoted by the hollow circle. 
In both cases the most striking change over time is the rise of the top
end of the range of valuation errors. In particular, the results suggest that,
after the release of 2001 ﬁnancial results (in May 2002 for most of the
sample and November 2001 for the remainder), the shares of more than
one-tenth of pension sponsors were at least 20 percent overvalued, and
that of the average pension sponsor was about 10 percent overvalued. Of
course, the dramatic rise in overvaluation errors in 2001 was driven
largely by the plunge in the net asset value of pension plans while, by con-
trast, pension earnings barely fell.
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gate, which reaches 5 percent by the end of 2001.30 Indeed, the simula-
tions suggest that pension accounting did not substantially add to any
stock market bubble during the latter half of the 1990s. We note in pass-
ing, however, that our analysis considers only a “level effect” from higher
pension earnings on equity prices. Another potential channel for the
impact on stock prices is through growth expectations, that is, through the
effect of actual growth on expected longer-term growth. As documented
by Steven Sharpe, during the latter half of the 1990s the average nominal
long-term growth forecast by analysts rose more than 3 percentage points,
and stock prices were apparently quite sensitive to the beliefs reﬂected in
those forecasts.31 If analysts and investors had extrapolated from the boost
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Figure 4. Estimated Valuation Errors as a Share of Firm Market Value, 1993–2001a
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. The implied valuation error is the increment to the stock price when pension earnings per share is multiplied by the earnings
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30. Moreover, because the sample represents only about three-quarters of the S&P 500
by market value, the implied mispricing error for the S&P composite index was less than
4 percent after 2001. Of course, in terms of absolute dollars (about 4 percent of nearly
$10 trillion) the excess value is not insigniﬁcant. 
31. Sharpe (2002).
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growth forecasts, then pension earnings could account for a larger share
of the runup in stock prices.
Before concluding, we speculate on how the stock price effects of the
swing in pension values might play out going forward, as the dismal
“unexpected” returns of recent years are amortized into pension earnings.
One fairly neutral approach involves projecting the path of pension earn-
ings and pension net asset value under the assumption that, on average,
companies earn their expected long-run return of 8 to 9 percent on their
pension portfolios during 2003–06. In this scenario, amortization of the
negative unexpected returns earned in 2000 through 2002 is complete by
the end of 2006. In addition, we assume that companies continue making
fairly large cash contributions to their pensions, at a rate of $30 billion to
$40 billion a year, which in this scenario would bring the aggregate value
of pension assets, net of obligations, back up near zero by the end of 2006.
Under these assumptions, the after-tax value of net pension assets
(given an effective tax rate of 0.25) would follow a trajectory like that
depicted by the solid line in ﬁgure 5. After dropping to around –$150 bil-
lion in 2002, on balance, S&P 500 net pension positions gradually move
back toward full funding, reaching –$25 billion by 2006. At the same
time, pension earnings, which are estimated to have declined from
$20.5 billion in 2001 to $16.0 billion in 2002, are projected to decline
steadily to –$6.5 billion by 2006. If investors continue to value pension
earnings at a market multiple of, say, 18, the trajectory of pension effects
on the aggregate market value of sponsors’ equity would look something
like the dashed line in the ﬁgure. The overvaluation of pension plans, as
measured by the gap between these two lines, is thus estimated to have
risen a bit further in 2002, before reversing itself over subsequent years.
By the end of the projection period, the sign of the gap reverses, reﬂecting
overweighting of negative pension earnings by investors.
Of course, the range of possibilities is quite large. Moreover, the
greater scrutiny now being given to pension accounting may already have
begun to induce investment professionals to differentiate between core
and pension earnings and devote greater attention to pension balance
sheets. This trend is likely to be reinforced by companies with pension
plans, as they try to convey to investors that any negative earnings
momentum from their plan does not reﬂect poor health of their core busi-
ness—an incentive that was not present on the upside of this cycle.
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This study has examined how deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans have
affected the equity prices of sponsoring ﬁrms during the past ten years, a
time when stock market–driven changes to the value of net pension oblig-
ations had a substantial effect on both the theoretical value of the spon-
soring ﬁrm’s balance sheet and the trajectory of its reported earnings. We
tested whether investors value sponsors’ DB pension exposures by look-
ing at the fair market value of pension assets and obligations disclosed in
the footnotes to their ﬁnancial statements, or by looking at pension ﬁnanc-
ing effects in their accounting earnings.
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Figure 5. Projected Net Pension Assets and Market Value of Pension 
Earnings, 2001–06a
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Compustat and I/B/E/S.
a. Net pension assets equals the projected market value of pension assets minus the projected pension beneﬁt obligation assum-
ing that pension portfolios earn 8.5 percent a year in 2003–06, and that companies make substantial annual cash contributions over
these years. Value of pension earnings is projected by amortizing previous unexpected returns into market-related value under the
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pension plans are often a very misleading measure of the underlying value
of net pension obligations, the market seems to have largely focused on
these accruals. Moreover, the valuation that the market places on these
pension-related accruals is at least as high as, if not higher than, the value
it places on core earnings. An implication, which we calibrated, is that the
stocks of a number of S&P 500 companies that sponsor DB pension plans
were substantially overvalued in recent years.
A broad implication of these ﬁndings—and one that would probably
not surprise accountants as much as economists—is that accounting mat-
ters. Complicated distortions embedded in the bottom-line ﬁgures that are
emphasized in ﬁnancial statements and press releases can distort the mar-
ket prices of equities substantially. This occurs even though the under-
lying details are disclosed in the footnotes to the ﬁnancial statements, and
thus are available to experts to more accurately gauge ﬁrm value. In par-
ticular, these ﬁndings provide support for complaints that the system of
pension accounting introduced by FAS 87 should be reexamined and
revised. Indeed, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has recently
indicated its intention to seek more frequent and fuller disclosure of infor-
mation on pension obligations and accruals and has announced a project
to develop a new pension accounting standard. We expect that serious
consideration will also be given to the broader question of whether pen-
sion accounting should move toward a mark-to-market approach, with
pension gains and losses ﬂowing transparently through ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
statements.
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Discussion
Mark J. Warshawsky:1 Pension accounting is a timely and important
topic, because of the speciﬁc issue of measuring pension funding ade-
quacy and because of the broader issue of ﬁnancial accounting accuracy.
(Of particular interest is the subissue of the appropriate discount rate to be
used in calculating the pension liability.) Knowledge of these subjects has
spread beyond the experts and into the broader public. The importance
and relevance of this paper’s results are further heightened by potentially
even broader implications going beyond pension accounting to govern-
ment budget accounting and Social Security reform. My comment will
summarize the paper and offer some questions and suggestions to chal-
lenge the analysis. 
The paper’s main result is that the market mistakenly focuses on
smoothed pension earnings, or expenses (as argued by the opaque hypoth-
esis), rather than on net pension assets, or obligations (as argued by the
transparent hypothesis), in establishing the effect of a deﬁned-beneﬁt pen-
sion plan on a ﬁrm’s value. The analysis is based on Compustat and
I/B/E/S data from 1993 to 2001 on the ﬁrms included in the S&P 500
from December 1996 through 1998. 
The authors primarily use a residual income model with both nested
and nonnested tests of the transparent versus the opaque hypothesis. Pen-
sion earnings are deﬁned on an after-tax, per-share basis net of pension
service cost, where the after-tax measure is “hard-wired,” that is, set by
the authors’ own formula. Net pension assets are deﬁned as the market
360
1. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Treasury Department or the administration.
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(There is a difference between the projected beneﬁt obligation and the
accumulated beneﬁt obligation, as I will discuss later.) A combined data
set approach is used, with projected earnings and time dummies as inde-
pendent variables. Annual cross sections, ﬁxed effects, and the dividend
discount model, however, are also included in the analysis to test for
robustness. Various tests support the opaque hypothesis.
Some other results are also emphasized. One is that the market may be
prone to overprice companies with defined-benefit plans because of the
difference between the assumed rate of return on investment and the dis-
count rate used to determine the present value of benefit obligations.
Sample statistics in the paper imply that pension earnings are overval-
ued, at least when the market declines. The authors also find that firms
with high ratios of stock price to core earnings also exhibit high ratios of
stock price to pension earnings. Simulation results support significant
overpricing of the upper range of the evaluation distribution.
The paper cites a significant recent professional literature, primarily
from the accounting field, as well as some earlier papers. The timeline
suggests a bit of an era effect in the literature. The early papers were
written before FAS 87 went into effect and well before the issuance of
FAS 106 on retiree health beneﬁts accounting. Actual accounting stan-
dards for corporate DB pension plans were not yet in place, and therefore
regression analysis was used to estimate the impact of disclosed net assets
on valuation. In these cases there were no associated expenses, and hence
the early literature may not be pertinent to the results in this paper. 
A more relevant task is to reconcile the paper’s results with papers
written after FAS 87 went into effect; of these, the most signiﬁcant work
cited is that by Barth, Beaver, and Landsman,2 which arrives at a different
result than the present authors. The analysis by Barth and her coauthors
uses data from an earlier period, which leads me to suggest that the
authors try to reconcile their differing results and to consider different
three- to ﬁve-year periods to ensure the robustness of their results. Also
cited is a very recent working paper by Brown,3 which focuses on actuar-
ial assumptions and suggests their importance in ﬁrm valuation. I discuss
the relevant discount rate information below.
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compare the results. There may also be a sample selection bias. The S&P
500 continually adds new ﬁrms and, more signiﬁcant, drops failing ﬁrms.
For these failing ﬁrms, and for those the market thinks might be approach-
ing failure, the projected beneﬁt obligation becomes much less relevant
than the accumulated beneﬁt obligation, because the projection of future
salary increases is not relevant. Also, when a ﬁrm is on a downward path,
there may be a lag between this new, shrunken reality and its reﬂection in
the retirement and cash distribution assumptions made by the ﬁrm’s actu-
aries and accountants. The PBGC put option—the agency’s guarantee of
the  ﬁrm’s pension beneﬁts—may become more relevant as the ﬁrm
declines. But, ironically, the tax considerations may become less relevant,
and the hardwired tax calculation employed here may be less accurate.
A very simple test of the authors’ hypothesis may be possible. As the
paper emphasizes, what is important for the calculation of pension
expense is the assumed (expected) long-run rate of return on assets. The
actual return on plan assets is disclosed, however, and the difference
between this and the assumed return may be a signiﬁcant variable in ﬁrm
valuation, if the authors’ hypothesis is true. Similarly, an examination of
the nature of a pension trust may be warranted, and the composition of
assets may be a signiﬁcant variable, although this would require a more
complex analysis.
The period the authors examine saw many ﬁnancial restatements
whose full relevance and signiﬁcance may not yet have emerged. Was the
accounting information that later appeared in the ﬁnancial restatements
available to the market when the prices that the authors used in their
analysis were observed? Another potential missing variable is employee
stock options. These became very popular during the period, and some
believe they were not properly accounted for. Signiﬁcant measurement
problems may have arisen in other areas of ﬁnancial accounting, such as
accounting for special-purpose entities. It may also be important to adjust
for changes in accounting standards that occurred over this period. In
ﬁnancial accounting, certain assets and obligations on which tax is
deferred may also have relevance, given useful available information.
The details of pension accounting are extremely complex, but some
technical points could also be used to test the paper’s hypothesis. There is
somewhat faster amortization of actual asset returns in excess of the
assumed return outside of a 10 percent corridor, which, if disclosed, could
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additional liability is sometimes recognized on the balance sheet when the
market value of pension assets is less than the accumulated beneﬁt obli-
gation. In 2001 and 2002 many ﬁrms will have been in this situation, and
because this information is disclosed and available to the market, it may
be relevant to the authors’ hypothesis.
The discount rate used in calculating the obligation may also be quite
relevant, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has indicated,
both recently and in the past, some concern about misuse of these rates. In
addition, some are confused by the different discount rates used for
accounting purposes and funding calculations, and therefore I will review
this topic here. 
The ERISA discount rate used in funding is a formula rate, calculated
as a moving average of the rate on thirty-year Treasury securities. It actu-
ally has no relation, either logical or empirical, with the rate stipulated by
FAS 87, which is used by ﬁrms in their ﬁnancial accounting.
The funding rules for pension plans provide for two funding accounts: a
standard account and a backup account. The discount rate for the standard
account is chosen by the actuary and usually reﬂects the expected return on
plan assets. The backup account is for underfunded plans, and the discount
rate there is a corridor of a weighted four-year moving average of the yield
on the thirty-year Treasury bond, as mentioned above. This corridor itself
has changed over time with changes in legislation. Figure 1 compares a
time series of this discount rate for funding with the current yields on
thirty-year Treasury bonds and on high-grade corporate bonds. 
By contrast, the discount rate used in accounting is not formulaic.
Instead FAS 87 explicitly delineates guidelines for setting appropriate
rates. There is no connection to plan assets. Rates are to be based on cur-
rent prices for settling the pension obligation in group annuity markets.
These rates should vary depending on the duration of the liability.
According to FAS 87, a plan “covering only retired employees would be
expected to have signiﬁcantly different discount rates from one covering a
workforce of 30-year-olds. The disclosures required by this Statement
regarding components of the beneﬁt obligation will be more representa-
tionally faithful if individual discount rates applicable to various beneﬁt
deferral periods are selected.”4
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tent with FASB principles. Figure 2 shows examples for 1995, 1998,
2001, and 2002. FASB recommended use of a whole discount rate curve,
not a single discount rate. The levels and the shape of the spot rate curve
have clearly changed over time. 
Whereas figure 2 shows what FAS 87 dictates should be done, fig-
ure 3 explains what has been done. The figure shows the distribution of
actual discount rates used by S&P 500 firms with DB plans. The distri-
bution has tightened over time, perhaps in response to expressions of SEC
concern. Figure 4 shows the average discount rate weighted by the pro-
jected benefit obligation from 1991 through 2001. The average in 2001,
about 7
1⁄4 percent, is considerably above the thirty-year Treasury bond
rate and the current liability rate, somewhat above the rate derived from
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Figure 1. Legislated Maximum Discount Rate Used in Required Funding for DB
Pension Plans and Selected Market Interest Rates, 1995–2003
Sources: Salomon Brothers data and author’s calculations.
a. Salomon Brothers yield on AAA/AA-rated corporate bonds.
b. Maximum rate of return that corporate DB plans are allowed to use in estimating the discounted value of plan beneﬁts for
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1440-05 BPEA/Coronado  07/17/03  08:13  Page 364the pension curve (particularly if the plan had older participants and
many retirees), and about equal to the high-grade corporate bond rate, as
shown in figure 1.
The discount rate is very important in the measurement of the pension
obligation and, therefore, of the net pension asset. The SEC, both in the
past and more recently, has expressed some concern about the discount
rates companies have used in calculating the obligations. Thus there may
be measurement errors in net pension assets as well as in net pension
earnings, to which the paper should give special attention.
As the paper states, there are indications of dissatisfaction with pension
accounting as evidenced by S&P’s pro forma measures of core earnings
and various Wall Street studies. In addition, pension accounting is com-
plex, and some simpliﬁcation may be desirable. The paper makes the very
interesting point that having a DB plan may be positive for ﬁrm value,
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Figure 2. Salomon Brothers Pension Discount Rate Curve, Selected Years















1440-05 BPEA/Coronado  07/17/03  08:13  Page 365366 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
Figure 3. Distribution of Discount Rates Used in Financial Accounting for Corporate
DB Pension Plans, 1991 and 2001a
Source: Compustat data.
a. S&P 500 ﬁrms only.
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tions of returns on assets without also considering the risk of those assets.
This would indicate that stochastic demonstrations may have some place
in ﬁnancial accounting for pensions. 
The paper’s conclusions also have relevance to Social Security. Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has suggested that the federal
government adopt accrual accounting for Social Security and Medicare,
and presumably this suggestion would also apply to other social insurance
programs for which demographic trends are important. The experience
with ﬁnancial accounting for pensions and retiree health beneﬁts is thus
quite relevant.
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Figure 4. Average Discount Rate Used in Financial Accounting for Corporate DB
Pension Plans, 1991–2001a
Source: Compustat data.
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accounting for pension plans? There is a tension between the accountants’
desire for smoothing, on the one hand, and the need for timeliness and
accuracy, on the other. There is also a tension between the need for sim-
plicity and transparency, on the one hand, and the need to accommodate
policy agendas and different economic situations, on the other. The pres-
ent complexity in pension accounting has also arisen from competition
between interest groups and their agendas. Clearly, accounting and dis-
closure both matter.
General discussion: Steven Durlauf criticized the dividend stock price
model that the authors used in comparing pension valuation alternatives.
He noted that the model has done poorly in numerous empirical investiga-
tions, stimulating the development of extensions such as nonseparable
preferences and time-varying discount rates. This long history of empiri-
cal difﬁculties clouded the interpretation of the authors’ results. For
example, one of the measures of pension value would correlate better with
the factors behind an unexplained market bubble, even though it did not
represent a variable that investors focus on. Durlauf suggested that the
authors provide checks on the robustness of their results to the chosen
model specification. Steven Sharpe responded that the annual cross-
sectional regressions supported the dominance of pension earnings over
net pension assets in all years except 1998, indicating that the basic
results did not arise from the general stock price bubble. 
Peter Orszag questioned the assumption that net pension assets should
be valued somewhere between (1 – t) and 1, regardless of how much the
plan might be under- or overfunded. When a weak ﬁrm has a severely
underfunded plan, the Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation steps in,
and a reversion tax applies to very high levels of overfunding. Orszag
worried that using a common valuation of assets for all ﬁrms might bias
the results, and he suggested limiting the analysis to ﬁrms whose net pen-
sion assets are within 5 or 10 percent of their pension beneﬁt obligation.
Julia Coronado agreed that the PBGC’s insurance of pension assets would
affect valuations. But she did not believe the empirical work was seri-
ously affected, because the sample consisted overwhelmingly of prof-
itable ﬁrms that were neither dramatically underfunded nor in a very weak
operating condition. The sample thus largely excludes ﬁrms for which
pension beneﬁt obligations are not a correct measure of liability. 
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siderable potential measurement error, both because of the somewhat
arbitrary discount rate that ﬁrms use and because of many other assump-
tions that the plan’s actuaries can make. Although it remains unclear how
investors actually value these obligations, it is possible that they look
through the actuaries’ assumptions and come up with better valuations
than those reported in the footnotes. While conceding this possibility,
Sharpe noted that, in regressions that do not include pension earnings as a
variable, pension assets and pension liabilities have coefﬁcients of
approximately the same absolute size when entered into the regression
separately. 
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